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Abstract
The essential claim of MMT is sovereign currency issuing governments, with flexible
exchange rates and without foreign currency debt, are financially unconstrained. This
paper analyzes the macroeconomic arguments behind that claim and shows they are
suspect. MMT underestimates the economic costs and exaggerate the capabilities of
deficit financed fiscal policy. Those analytic shortcomings render it poor economics.
However, MMT’s claim that sovereign governments are financially unconstrained is
proving a popular political polemic. That is because current distressed economic
conditions have generated political resistance to fiscal austerity, and MMT fits the
moment by countering the neoliberal polemic that government lacks fiscal space because
it is akin to a household.
Keywords: Modern money theory (MMT), budget deficits, job guarantee program.
JEL ref.: E00, E12, E40, E58, E60.
1. Introduction: a brief overview of MMT
Recently, there has been a burst of interest in modern money theory (MMT).1 MMT is
associated with a small over-lapping group of economists at the University of Missouri,
Kansas City and the Levy Economics Institute. Leading contributors include Warren
Mosler, Stefanie Kelton, and Randall Wray. Australian economist William Mitchell is
also a leading contributor. An early comprehensive statement of MMT is provided in
Wray’s 1998 book Understanding Modern Money: The Key to Full Employment and
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The burst of interest is evident in extensive media references. Stephanie Kelton, a leading MMT
proponent, was an economic adviser to Senator Bernie Sanders. It is also evidenced by the fact that MMT
has prompted critical debunking responses from leading mainstream economists, such as Ken Rogoff
(2019) and Greg Mankiw (2020), who usually disdain engagement with non-mainstream economists.
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Price Stability.2
The essence of MMT is that sovereign currency issuing governments, with
flexible exchange rates and without foreign currency debt, are financially unconstrained.
That is because government has the power to create money to pay its bills, including its
debts. The only constraint on government is the availability of real resources. If the
resources are available, government can buy them and pay for them by creating money. If
they are not available, creating money to buy goods causes inflation.3
According to MMT, a corollary implication of that is taxes are not needed to
finance spending. Instead, the role of taxes is to drain money out of the economy after
government has spent it, in order to manage aggregate demand and keep it in line with
the available supply of resources.
As shown in Figure 1, MMT rests on a triad of arguments concerning:
(i) the macroeconomics of money and bond financed budget deficits,
(ii) the employer of last resort or job guarantee program, and
(iii) the history of money.
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The founding manifesto statement of MMT is Mosler (1996). Wray (1998) represents the first
comprehensive statement and, in my view, is the clearest. Wray (2015) provides a further elaborated
comprehensive statement that incorporates additional material on sectoral balance macroeconomic
accounting, money creation accounting, and exchange rate regimes. As discussed further in the text of this
article, a major problem with these elaborations is that they obscure the essence of MMT by conflating it
with other issues and controversies in macroeconomics.
3
For instance, Nersisyan and Wray (2020) write modern money theory “demonstrates that a government
like that of the US does not, in fact, face financial constraints…. MMT’s proponents have always
maintained that government spending is limited only by available economic capacity.” Nersisyan and Wray
(2010) debate the issue of limits to government debt and conclude “sovereign government is not
constrained financially, which means it can never face a solvency issue (p.19)” and “inflation is the true
limit to government spending not lack of financing (p.20).”
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Figure 1. Overview of modern money theory (MMT).

Macroeconomics of money &
bond financed budget deficits

Modern money theory
(MMT)

History of money

Employer of last resort (ELR)
or job guarantee program (JPG)

The “meat and potatoes” component is the macroeconomics of money and bond
financed budget deficits. It describes MMT’s view of how government finance works,
why taxes are not needed to finance spending, and why government is financially
unconstrained.
The second leg of the triad is the employer of last resort (ELR) or job guarantee
program (JPG). That component is the policy component, and it claims to show how the
economics of MMT can be harnessed by policy to deliver non-inflationary full
employment.
The third leg of the triad is the history of money, which is invoked to enlist
monetary history on MMT’s side. The historical claim is that money’s origins are chartal.
That means modern money came into being because government issued it as a form of
IOU token to pay for goods, and those tokens were accepted because they could be used
to pay taxes.
3

The paper analyzes and dissects the three legs of the triad and shows they all
involve suspect economic arguments. MMT focuses on government’s technical capacity
to issue money, which seemingly renders government financially unconstrained.
However, budget deficits can have costly ramifications measured in terms of
government’s policy objectives, which can deter government from deficit spending.
MMT neglects those costly ramifications, leading it to underestimate the economic costs
and exaggerate the capabilities of deficit financed fiscal policy.
The conclusion is MMT’s analytic shortcomings render it poor economics. That
said, its printing press approach to government spending is proving a popular political
polemic, countering neoliberal polemic which justifies fiscal austerity by describing
government as akin to a household.
2. Some clarifying preliminaries
Before turning to the substance of the argument, some preliminary ground clearing is
necessary. That is because a major difficulty debating MMT is the tendency to conflate
important but unrelated issues. That is evident in the tendency for debate to bleed into a
broader debate about macroeconomics, rather than sticking with what is specifically
unique to MMT. Before getting to what is specifically unique to MMT it is therefore
useful to identify some issues that are not at stake.
2.a Keynesianism is not the issue.
The MMT debate is not about Keynesianism and the Keynesian principle of demand
determined output. Proponents of MMT adhere to the Keynesian theory of effective
demand determined output, but so too do MMT’s Keynesian critics – including this
author.
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2.b The effectiveness of deficit financed fiscal policy is not the issue.
The MMT debate is also not about the effectiveness of deficit financed fiscal policy. That
is clear from consideration of the ISLM model which dominated Keynesian
macroeconomics through to the mid-1970s. In that model, policymakers can push the
economy to full employment via expansionary fiscal policy. Bond financed fiscal
stimulus shifts the IS schedule in an expansionary direction, while money financed
stimulus shifts both the IS and LM schedules in an expansionary direction. If the central
bank is targeting the interest rate, the IS shifts in an expansionary direction and the LM
schedule is horizontal. That illustrates how fiscal policy effectiveness and the ability to
use fiscal policy to obtain full employment are not unique to MMT, and MMT actually
uses the same Keynesian logic as the ISLM in explaining fiscal policy effectiveness.
2.c Money versus bond financed fiscal deficits is not the issue.
Nor is the issue money or bond finance. As shown above, both money and bond financed
fiscal policy are effective in Keynesian theory, and money financed deficits are more
expansionary because they deter any proclivity to interest rate crowding-out from
increased bond supplies. Current institutional arrangements have fiscal deficits financed
by bonds. However, if the central bank is targeting interest rates or engaging in
quantitative easing (QE), there is some implicit money financing via central bank bond
purchases. The money versus bond financing question is an institutional design and
policy choice question, with MMT supporters tending to advocate that the fiscal authority
be given direct access to the central bank’s power to issue money. That is a political
economy issue which has long been understood, and MMT takes a particular stance.
Whether deficits are bond or money financed is not germane to MMT’s larger theoretical
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claim about sovereign governments being financially unconstrained.4
2.d The need for fiscal stimulus is not the issue.
Likewise, the need for fiscal stimulus is not the issue. MMT proponents are strong
advocates of fiscal stimulus and have advocated more stimulus, even as the US economy
approached unemployment rates traditionally associated with full employment (Kelton et
al., 2018). They also advocate a fiscal policy architecture based on Lerner’s (1943, 1951)
functional finance construct. Those are issues of policy choice rather than fundamental
monetary theory. Many Keynesians have also advocated similar stimulus policies, yet
they disagree with MMT’s monetary theory claims. That shows the design and stance of
fiscal policy is not the core issue. However, since MMT has gained media prominence via
its fiscal policy recommendations, that has contributed to a misunderstanding whereby
fiscal policy effectiveness and design are misinterpreted as being the theoretical issues
raised by MMT.5
2.e Stock-flow consistent modelling, endogenous money and private debt are not the
issues.
Stock-flow consistent modelling, endogenous money and private sector debt are also not
the issues. These are all features of the macroeconomic framework used by MMT
proponents, but they are also all part of the Post-Keynesian consensus and long pre-date
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According to MMT, if bond financing runs into trouble, government can simply switch to money
financing without consequence. In common with standard Keynesian macroeconomics, MMT does
recognize that money and bond financing are different in that bond financing entails an interest payment,
which is expansionary as it increases household income. It is also the case that payment tends to be
regressive as wealthier households own the larger part of the government debt.
5
That said, since fiscal policy is center stage in the public debate, it is worth clarifying its place. For thirty
years, a substantial segment (perhaps, even a majority) of mainstream economists inclined against fiscal
policy effectiveness. As Keynesianism retreated within the mainstream economics profession, that
diminished the Keynesian voice regarding fiscal policy effectiveness. MMT has contributed to resurrecting
that voice.
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MMT. The interest in stock-flow consistent macroeconomics traces back to 1960s neoKeynesian economics (Christ, 1968) which explicitly focused on the implications of
budget deficits for the debt stock and money supply. MMT obscures the issue by tending
to claim these features as its own (Lavoie, 2019), and by even presenting them as the
substance of MMT. For instance, Tymoigne and Wray (2015) respond to criticisms of
MMT with twenty pages describing the injection – withdrawal monetary accounting
relations connecting different sectors within the economy, rather than addressing the
criticisms regarding policy constraints.
2.f Macroeconomic sectoral balance analysis is not the issue.
Lastly, macroeconomic sectoral balance analysis is not the issue. MMT proponents
emphasize such analysis (Wray, 2015; Mitchell et al., 2019), but such analysis long predates MMT. The Keynesian economist James Tobin (1963) was an early pioneer who
showed how government deficits implied private sector surpluses. Likewise, the British
Keynesian economist Wynne Godley (1999) used sectoral balance analysis to explain
emerging financial instability in the 1990s U.S. economy. The important point is sectoral
balance analysis follows from the national income accounts, was pioneered by Keynesian
economists, and MMT adds nothing to it per se.6
3. The macroeconomics of money and bond financed budget deficits7
The previous section highlighted what MMT is not about. It is now time to engage what
it is about. The “meat and potatoes” theoretical claim of MMT is that sovereign currency
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Sectoral balance analysis is an accounting exercise. The interesting question is what is the theory that
explains the accounting outcomes. Keynesian macroeconomics provides one theoretical perspective. MMT
adds nothing to the theoretical explanation of sectoral balances and relies exclusively on long established
Keynesian logic.
7
Many of the arguments in this section are drawn from Palley (2015a, 2015b).
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issuing governments, with flexible exchange rates and without foreign currency debt, are
financially unconstrained and do not need taxes to finance their spending. That is because
such governments can always pay by “printing” money. In modern parlance, printing
money means electronically creating money via central bank keyboard entries that credit
agents with money claims against the central bank. As Wray writes:
“The important thing to notice is that the Treasury spends before and without
regard to either previous receipt of taxes or prior bond sales…. The implication
is that tax payments do not ‘finance’ government spending but they create a
demand for currency and impact reserves (Wray, 1998, p.78).”
Additionally, MMT claims government spending is essential as it is the only way to get
money into the system, and it is impossible to pay taxes without money in the system.8
Thus, Wray writes:
“In principle, then, the government first spends fiat money (to purchase goods,
services, and assets or to provide ‘transfer payments’, which retires a
government liability). Once government has spent, then the fiat money is
available to be transferred to the government to meet tax liabilities. As a matter
of logic, the public cannot pay fiat money to the government to meet tax
liabilities until the government has paid out fiat money to the public (Wray,
1998, p.80).”
Together, those two propositions support MMT’s fundamental claim that “monetarily
sovereign governments have a flexible policy space unconstrained by hard financial
limits (Tymoigne and Wray, 2015, p.24). “
Given the above, MMT recommends that government should spend until the
economy reaches full employment and all workers who want a job are employed. At that
stage, government can raises taxes and drain money from the economy to prevent
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That seems to tacitly suggest MMT is supportive of money financed deficits. Unfortunately, as noted
earlier, in practice MMT proponents are ambiguous over whether budget deficits should be money or bond
financed.
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inflation. That policy recommendation is an application of Lerner’s principle of
functional finance (Lerner, 1943, 1951). A corollary proposition is that the interest rate is
discarded as a tool of stabilization policy and parked. The MMT recommendation is to
park the interest rate at zero (Wray, 1998, p.87; Wray, 2007, p.22; Forstater and Mosler
2005).
Essentially, MMT recommends that deficit financed fiscal policy replace
monetary policy for purposes of reaching and sustaining full employment. More
specifically, government spending (including spending on guaranteed jobs) should be
used to drive the economy to full employment, and thereafter taxes should be adjusted to
prevent inflation.9 Taxes are not needed to finance spending because money is unbacked
fiat (so-called modern money) and can always be created by government to pay for
resources.
Figure 2 provides a taxonomy of the macroeconomic critique of MMT which is
the focus of the rest of this section. As can be seen, the critique is extensive and multifaceted, and it identifies a mix of sins of omission and commission. MMT’s simplistic
construction of the economy omits critical features that impact the economic cost and
effectiveness of budget deficits. At the same time, its simplistic construction includes
features and policy recommendations that are highly problematic.
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Recently, MMT proponents have begun walking-back the idea that functional finance is central to MMT
(Wray, comments at the Eastern Economic Association, March 2019). The purpose of the walk-back
appears to be to deny that taxes are needed at full employment to neutralize inflationary excess demand
caused by excessive government spending. Three points follow. First, it is fundamentally dishonest to deny
the long-standing central role of functional finance in MMT’s argument, as evidenced in the early
contribution of Kelton (1999). Second, walking back the need for taxes means MMT has now shifted to
arguing that inflation control should be conducted via rationing, price controls, and other administrative
measures (Nersisyan and Wray, 2019). Third, it is illustrative of the difficulty understanding and debating
MMT as its proponents repeatedly change their positions.
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Figure 2. Taxonomy of the macroeconomic critique of MMT.
Macroeconomic
critique of MMT

Recycled & oversimplified
Old Keynesian economics

Political economy limits
to fiscal policy

Macroeconomic constraints
& adverse policy feedbacks

Disingenuity
on taxes

Interest rate policy & the problem
of targets and instruments

Exorbitant privilege &
US centric thinking

3.1 Recycled and oversimplified old Keynesian economics
As regards the first column in Figure 2, the critique of MMT is that it “is a mix of old and
new, the old is correct and well understood, while the new is substantially wrong (Palley,
2015b, p.45).” MMT’s main macroeconomic claim to fame rests on its declaration
regarding government’s ability to finance spending without recourse to taxation owing to
its ability to issue money. In fact, government’s ability to create money to finance
spending has long been widely recognized by all economists, who have also long
recognized that ability gives government considerable extra financial and policy space.10
For instance, using a stock – flow consistent ISLM model with a fully specified
government budget restraint, Blinder and Solow (1973) show how money financed
budget deficits can move an economy to full employment. The logic is simple. Money
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Keynesian economists tend to emphasize how the ability to create money provides fiscal policy space to
manage aggregate demand. Classical macroeconomists tend to emphasize how it enables government to
collect seignorage via inflation, thereby providing another source of tax revenue that can be an
economically efficient way of raising revenue. In this author’s view, both groups are right.
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financed budget deficits create financial wealth, which increases aggregate demand (AD)
via the consumption wealth effect, thereby moving the economy to full employment.11
Old Keynesian economics clearly recognized the capacity of government to
finance spending without taxes. That said, there are two “new” components to MMT. The
first is the claim that government has to spend to inject state money into the system to
pay taxes.12 The second concerns the macroeconomics of government finance, with
MMT claiming that government’s ability to create money means government is
financially unconstrained and can costlessly push the economy to full employment.
As regards injecting state money to pay taxes, MMT is strictly wrong with its
claim that the public cannot pay taxes until government has first spent. In fact, the central
bank is the source of state money (so-called outside or high-powered money). It can
inject outside money into the system by buying existing government bonds, buying
private sector assets, or by lending to private banks. Moreover, under the current system,
the central bank will increase the outside money stock by paying interest on existing
money balances. That means government spending is not the only way to get state money
to pay taxes into the system.
Furthermore, a central bank that is targeting interest rates is obliged to provide
whatever outside money the private sector needs, including money to pay its taxes, to
prevent interest rates from rising. That is because the short-term interest rate is the price
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Bond financed deficits are analytically slightly more complicated because the increase in bond supplies
can potentially increase interest rates. That was the basis of the “crowding-out” debate of the 1970s, but it
turns out bond financed deficits still move the economy to full employment absent perverse effects.
Moreover, it is a non-issue if the central bank targets interest rates, in which case the central bank implicitly
monetizes the deficit to prevent the increase in bond supplies from raising interest rates.
12
For instance, Wray (1998, p.80) writes “In principle, then, the government first spends fiat
money….Once the government has spent, then the fiat money is available to be transferred to the
government to meet tax liabilities. As a matter of logic, the public cannot pay fiat money to the government
to meet tax liabilities until the government has paid out fiat money to the public.”
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of state money, and a shortage of state money will place upward pressure on the shortterm interest rate.13
As regards the macroeconomics of government finance, MMT focuses on
accounting and stock-flow relations. There are two points to make. First, those
accounting and stock-flow relations have long been understood by Keynesian and neoKeynesian economists.14 Second, and more importantly, MMT’s accounting framework
has a static “moment in time” character and is bereft of behavioral content. That lack of
dynamics and behavioral content leads to fundamentally flawed claims regarding the
macroeconomic effects of money financed deficits and government’s ability to use deficit
finance to secure its policy goals (about which more below).
The point of departure of MMT’s macroeconomic analysis is the government
budget constraint, and MMT objects to its being called a constraint as if government were
a household. However, that is a terminological objection. Moreover, Old Keynesians also
recognized it was not a constraint and referred to it as the budget identity or budget
restraint (Christ, 1968). Its significance is it tracks the impact of budget outcomes on
stocks of inside money and government debt, and it holds for all governments.15
The critical theoretical question is what are the macroeconomic impacts of
changes in those stocks and the changes in AD that they finance. MMT sees the effects of
increasing government financial obligations as entirely benign, and policymakers can use
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Michell (2019) has recently made similar observations. However, he claims MMT does not say
government spending is needed to pay taxes. That is contradicted by MMT’s the written record. The
argument that spending is needed to pay taxes has been an important part of MMT’s rhetoric claiming that
taxes do not finance spending and government is financially unconstrained.
14
For instance, those accounting and stock – flow relations were at the heart of the Yale School
macroeconomics research program developed by James Tobin in the 1960s (Tobin, 1969, 1982).
15
Sovereign governments can issue both money and bonds, whereas non-sovereign governments can only
issue bond.
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the financial space to costlessly boost demand and push the economy to full employment.
There are no negative consequences from increasing government financial obligations; no
conflicts with other policy objectives; and no policy implementation problems. In
contrast, Old Keynesians had a more complicated view of the economy in which negative
consequences, policy conflicts, and policy implementation problems are possible.16
As shown below, MMT’s macroeconomic policy assertions follow from its
oversimplified and incomplete Keynesian analysis. The lack of a dynamic economic
model with behavioral content is a glaring professional failure. Unfortunately, instead of
addressing that failure, MMT proponents have responded by claiming critics either do not
understand it or have misrepresented it.
The difficulty of confronting MMT about those failings is compounded by its
practice of walking back its positions and adopting those of its critics without
acknowledgment. Examples include replacing the full employment threshold model of
inflation (Wray, 1998) with the Keynesian Phillips curve model, and also recognizing that
capital controls may be needed to contain international economic forces that can
potentially disrupt fiscal policy. Recently, Kelton (2019) has slipped in another longstanding Keynesian argument that stability of the debt-GDP ratio requires that the
nominal interest rate be less than the nominal rate of growth (i < g). In doing so, she
tacitly admits another financial constraint on government and continues the walking back
process. On one hand, the walking back process is reasonable: on the other hand, it
dissolves MMT’s claims regarding government being financially unconstrained.
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Indeed, it can reasonably be argued that Old Keynesians were too benign in their assessment of deficit
financed policy. At the theoretical level, Old Keynesian models do a poor job of modelling private credit
markets, which excludes one of the principal channels whereby adverse effects of budget deficits might
show up. Likewise, the Keynesian Phillips curve approach to inflation can be argued to be too benign.
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3.2 Macroeconomic constraints and adverse policy feedbacks
The second column in Figure 2 concerns macroeconomic constraints and adverse policy
feedbacks which MMT ignores and which undermine its claim that government is
financially unconstrained. Though government has the formal technical ability to finance
all spending by creating money, that technical ability is a will-o-the-wisp because
government is constrained by the reality of potentially high economic costs of doing so.
Using the “printing press” to finance spending can create subsequent problems that leave
government worse off measured in terms of its objective function.
In the real world, economic policy and policy outcomes are subject to multiple
economic concerns and constraints. Those include concerns about government bond
rates, private credit market long-term interest rates, financial market stability, the balance
of payments and the exchange rate, the inflation constraint imposed via the Phillips
curve, and policy implementation and policy credibility constraints. Those various
concerns and constraints impact the economic costs and effectiveness of deficit financed
fiscal policy. However, they are all absent in MMT’s over-simplified theoretical
framework. In particular, MMT’s framework is static and has little to say about how
policy affects expectations of the future, and how expectations of the future have
important immediate consequences.
3.2.a Financial markets, the complex of interest rates, and asset prices
Government is likely to face significant financial market blowback if financial
markets believe it is engaging in excessive money issue. In particular, long-term interest
rates will tend to rise if financial market participants anticipate risks of future financial
turmoil or higher future inflation. Current financial market conditions are affected by
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expectations about the future, which means the future is always already here and in the
present. Consequently, inflationary bias in MMT’s reliance on money financed deficits
will creep into present financial market conditions long before full employment.
It is sometimes claimed that government can set the long-term bond interest rate,
just as it sets the short-term money market interest rate. The argument is government can
buy or sell long-term bonds to set the long-term interest rate in the same way it does for
the short-term rate. However, if private agents deem the bond rate too low given inflation
expectations created by money financed deficits, the government bond market will
shrivel, in the sense of fewer private agents being willing to buy government bonds. More
importantly, bond market repression does not prevent interest rates rising in private credit
markets, and they may even overshoot owing to unfavorable expectations caused by
money financed fiscal policy. Consequently, the combination of money financed deficits
and bond market repression can disrupt private credit flows, and thereby disrupt
economic activity. Furthermore, owing to expectations, those disruption effects can
emerge in advance of full employment. However, once again, such effects are absent in
MMT because it ignores expectations and treats private credit markets as irrelevant.
Increases in the money supply can also potentially cause asset price bubbles. That
is because some of the money injected into the circular flow of expenditure and income
leaks into the financial circuit via the process of saving (Palley, 1998), where it is
directed to bidding up asset prices. Bubbles are unstable and subject to abrupt crashes
owing to changes in sentiment and expectations. When they crash they can cause major
economic disruption, as illustrated by the financial crisis of 2008. Bubbles can also
develop independently of full employment. Those features give policymakers good
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reason to prevent them, which constrains policy. For instance, bond financing of deficits
may be preferable to money financing to the extent that bond financing is less likely to
promote financial market bubbles. However, bond financing raises its own concerns with
adverse interest rate effects and debt sustainability. Such considerations are absent in
MMT’s analysis because it is silent on asset price formation, the effect of asset prices,
and the impact of budget deficits on asset prices.
Interestingly, the effect of budget deficits on credit and asset markets will likely
depend on current conditions and expectations of future outcomes, with expectations
being influenced by the nature of the policy regime. That type of effect illustrates the
importance of the Lucas (1976) critique for understanding financial market responses to
deficit financed fiscal policy. Such concerns with the bond market’s reaction and
psychology were also central in Keynes’s critique of Lerner’s functional finance view and
its assertion that money-financed spending could effortlessly solve the Keynesian
macroeconomic problem (Aspromourgos, 2014). However, such effects are again absent
in MMT, which explains why MMT fails to recognize them.
3.2.b Exchange rate and trade balance concerns
Budget deficits can also have significant adverse exchange rate and balance of
payments effects, especially money financed deficits. Expansionary budget deficits bleed
into the trade deficit via their impact on income and the demand for imports. The
deterioration of the trade deficit then tends to depreciate the exchange rate. The exchange
rate will also tend to depreciate owing to adjustment of international portfolio positions.
Exchange rate depreciation can then cause inflation, which further aggravates the
depreciation problem. Additionally, under certain circumstances, exchange rate
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depreciation can trigger macroeconomic contraction (Krugman and Taylor, 1978).
Keynesian macroeconomics emphasizes international constraints, and they are
often summarized in models via the idea of a balance of payments constraint. However,
owing to its US-centric focus, MMT largely ignores such problems which are a firstorder constraint on economic policy in many countries. Moreover, in the past the US has
also been subject to such constraints, and it could confront them again in the future.
To the extent MMT discusses international constraints, it dismisses them with the
facile assertion that a floating exchange rate resolves them. However, a floating exchange
rate has its own adverse financial and inflation complications. Furthermore, if the balance
of payments constraint is structural, it can be unresponsive to exchange rate depreciation
owing to either induced inflation effects or low import and export elasticities.
3.2.c Inflation and the Phillips curve
Another problem is that inflation does not work as MMT describes. According to
MMT, government should run money financed budget deficits until all real resources are
employed. At that stage, the economy becomes supply-constrained and policy should step
on the budget brake to prevent emergence of inflation. Inflation is therefore presented as
a “threshold” problem, but that is not how inflation develops in the real world. Instead,
the economy consists of multiple sectors, and some hit the full employment barrier before
others. Consequently, inflation starts bubbling up before there is aggregate full
employment, and government lacks the capacity to target its demand injections sector by
sector and market by market. Contrary to the claims of Wray (1998, p.viii), it is not easy
to have full employment without inflation, and policymakers confront an inescapable
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inflation - unemployment trade-off.17
Replacing the threshold model of inflation with a Phillips curve introduces the
familiar policy challenges of trade-offs and inflation expectations. As argued earlier,
those expectations are influenced by policy regime and they are likely to be adversely
impacted by adoption of an MMT policy regime. Furthermore, in an economy with a
backward bending Phillips curve (Rowthorn, 1977, Akerlof et al, 2000; Palley, 2003),
excessively expansionary money financed deficits could cause inflation expectations to
jump to the positively sloped portion of the Phillips trade-off where higher inflation
generates higher unemployment.
Interestingly, and not well advertised by proponents of MMT, such concerns
prompted Lerner (1977, 1978) to significantly qualify his system of functional finance. In
particular, Lerner was concerned about the problem of inflation posed by full
employment, which prompted him to develop his Wage-Increase Permit (WIP) plan
whereby the government would limit inflation by issuing tradeable permits allowing
wage increases.18 Ironically, MMT proponents tend to be especially dismissive of the
problem of inflation despite Lerner’s concern with inflation at full employment.
3.2.d Inflation, interest rates, and the policy mix
Introducing a Phillips curve introduces inflation and inflation affects the real
interest rate, which then unravels MMT’s approach to interest rate policy. MMT
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Wray writes “The primary policy conclusion that comes out of this analysis is, perhaps, shocking, but it
can be stated simply: it is possible to have truly full employment without causing inflation. This will appear
to be a desirable goal, but a preposterous claim; no self-respecting Keynesian, monetarist or supply-sider
would allow herself to entertain such hopes. But if the analysis here is correct – and it goes without saying
that I am sure it is – then the logical conclusion is that we can move immediately to full employment with
enhanced stability (Wray, 1998, viii).”
18
The scheme is modelled on the logic of tradeable pollution permits. Just as the aggregate issue of
pollution permits limits the amount of permissible pollution, so too the aggregate issue of wage increase
permits (WIPs) would limit the amount of aggregate permissible wage inflation.
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recommends parking the nominal interest rate at zero (Wray, 1998, p.87; Wray, 2007,
p.22; Forstater and Mosler 2005), which implies real rates would fall as the economy
moves up the Phillips curve.19 That potentially creates an unstable situation in which
higher inflation creates lower real interest rates which in turn drives higher inflation. The
converse problem would hold if the economy moved down the Phillips curve as real
interest rates would rise with unemployment, potentially causing even higher
unemployment.
Recognizing that interest rates matter introduces the familiar fiscal policy –
monetary policy mix problem which was a central concern of Old Keynesians, and which
is another concern that is entirely neglected by MMT. The greater the emphasis on fiscal
looseness, the more the need to raise real interest rates to avoid excessive AD. However,
higher interest rates negatively impact investment and growth. Consequently, a
government that is concerned about growth and future living standards will be concerned
about budget deficits and their implications for interest rates, which in turn means it is
financially constrained and concerned about bond market sentiments.
The problematic of the policy mix also connects with another neo-Keynesian
concern regarding portfolio crowding out (Haliassos and Tobin, 1990, p.893-894), which
is different from monetarist crowding out. Monetarist crowding out concerns the impact
of deficit financed fiscal policy on AD and output. Portfolio crowding out concerns the
impact of deficit financed fiscal policy on wealth composition. In particular, if the
demand for wealth is finite and government financial obligations are net wealth,
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Wray writes: “Given these considerations, as well as the arguments advanced by Keynes, a monetary
policy rule is preferred – set the overnight rate at zero, and keep it there. A properly programmed tin robot
ought to do the trick (Wray, 2007, p.22).”
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government deficits can crowd-out private capital accumulation by increasing the supply
of government wealth that must be held in private portfolios.
Restoring activist interest rate policy does not save MMT. Indeed, the opposite is
true. If policymakers are concerned about interest rates, they need to be concerned about
the state of the interest rate spectrum, of which the policy rate is part. That means
policymakers need to be concerned about financial market conditions, which implies
government is not financially unconstrained. Furthermore, maintaining an interest rate
target requires issuing government financial obligations, and government needs to be
concerned about the impact of that issuance on AD and financial markets. Again,
government is not unconstrained.
3.2.e Summing up: the problems are far more than just inflation
Putting the pieces together, the implication is sovereign governments’ ability to
use deficit financed fiscal policy (be it money or bond financed) is limited by market
constraints and reactions which impose costs on governments. The problems are far more
than just the possibility of inflation. The bite of market constraints, market reactions, and
induced policy costs varies according to economic conditions and policy regime. They
also vary by country (about which more below). That is not to say sovereign governments
have no space to use deficit (and money) financed fiscal policy, but it does say
governments are not financially unconstrained.
3.3 Political economy limits to fiscal policy
The third column in Figure 2 concerns the political economy failings of MMT. Those
political economy failings fundamentally challenge the viability of Lerner’s (1947, 1951)
functional finance approach and suggest an MMT policy regime could even create
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economic instability.
As noted earlier, according to neo-Keynesian logic, budget deficits drive the
economy to full employment by increasing wealth and AD. That makes it critical there be
institutional arrangements for closing the deficit once full employment is reached to
avoid inflationary excess. However, MMT relies on a highly simplified and implausible
political economy in its attempt to address that problem. Thus, it assumes taxes can be
abruptly and precisely raised at full employment to contain excess demand, when the
reality is taxes are politically contested and difficult to raise. Long ago, Friedman (1961)
argued that fiscal policy was impractical for “fine-tuning” stabilization policy owing to
inside (decision) and outside (implementation) lags. Those lags mean policy
implementation is likely to be poorly timed, so much so that it could amplify the business
cycle rather than dampen it.
The Friedman critique of fiscal policy concerns “timing” of policy actions. It can
be augmented to include a “public choice” critique based on politicians aversion to
raising taxes and cutting spending.20 That aversion stands to reinforce the problem of
fiscal policy timing. Additionally, it stands to impart an inflationary bias and gradually
ratchet up government spending as a share of GDP. That is relevant because MMT
recommends increased spending to stimulate the economy below full employment, and
higher taxes once full employment is reached. Over successive cycles MMT’s policy
frame is likely to be destabilizing.21 Absent budget discipline, spending and deficits
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The aversion to raising taxes is one reason why monetary policy is the preferred instrument of finetuning stabilization policy. Just as monetary policy is delegated to central banks to facilitate policy decision
making, so too tax policy could be delegated to a board of tax experts, but that would be a profoundly
undemocratic turn.
21
Those features explain why it is difficult to use fiscal policy to “fine tune” the economy, except for tax
and spending programs that operate automatically and counter-cyclically. That makes the ELR/JGP critical
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would tend to ratchet upward owing to the political attraction deficit financed spending
(especially money financed deficit spending) and the political aversion to higher taxes.
Yet, MMT reduces budget discipline by arguing the central bank should be under the
direct control of the fiscal authority which is encouraged to use money financed
deficits.22
Another political economy critique (Lavoie, 2014) is that central banks and fiscal
authorities are institutionally separated in most economies, but MMT ignores this and
treats them as a unified decision maker. The separation is usually justified on public
choice grounds that politicians have an inclination to inflationary monetary populism, and
separation of fiscal and monetary powers helps prevent that. MMT ignores the separation,
invoking an “as if” argument.
Two implications follow. First, as Lavoie (2014) notes, the current system does
not support MMT’s policy claims as the system is not structured as needed. Second, if the
system were changed and structured as required by MMT, financial markets would likely
shift to expecting an increased likelihood of inflationary monetary populism owing to
MMT’s policy frame. That would cause asset prices to fall and interest rates to rise.
The latter critique links to MMT’s comprehensive failure to take account of the
impact of expectations of policy on economic behaviors and financial markets.
Expectations about the future impact current private sector decision making, which
implies the inflationary bias in MMT’s fiscal policy assignment will impact present

for MMT as it is a form of counter-cyclical automatic stabilizer but, unfortunately, it is fraught for other
reasons.
22
Ironically, proponents of MMT appear to be exhibiting exactly this type of ratchet spending effect.
Initially, the focus of MMT’s spending recommendations was provision of an ELR job guarantee program
(Wray, 1998). To that has now been added Medicare for all, expanded Social Security, free college tuition
(plus forgiveness of existing college debt), and a Green New Deal (Palley, 2019).
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conditions long before inflation accelerates or full employment is reached. Given that, it
is easy to envisage how an MMT regime could even generate economic instability. An
untimely money financed fiscal stimulus could raise concerns about financial instability
or inflation expectations, thereby raising current market interest rates and prompting need
for further fiscal stimulus. That we do not see such patterns today may be because policy
is not constructed according to MMT’s institutional and policy recommendations.23
3.4 Interest rate policy and the problem of targets and instruments
The fourth column in Figure 2 concerns interest rate policy, and MMT proponents argue
the nominal interest rate should be parked at zero. The above political economy critiques
(regarding fine tuning and public choice biases) speak to the difficulty of using fiscal
policy to stabilize the business cycle and deliver full employment. For those reasons,
monetary policy (i.e. interest rate policy) is widely viewed as the preferred instrument for
delivering on those goals, yet MMT discards it by parking the interest rate which may
introduce instability (Palley, 2015a, p.17-18).24
That policy assignment failing is compounded by MMT’s specific interest rate
policy which may also create an instrument shortage problem. In a static economy,
policymakers aim to hit full employment, but they must also have a balanced budget to
prevent an exploding money – output ratio. If fiscal policy is constrained by minimum
spending requirements and maximum acceptable tax rates, it may not be possible to
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Ironically, an MMT policy regime could breathe life into the notion of expansionary austerity. Thus, an
MMT regime would tend to raise private sector interest rates. Abandoning the regime would tend to lower
them. Note, it is the change of regime that is important rather than specific government spending cuts or tax
increases.
24
Jayadev and Mason (2018) examine the assignment problematic in a dynamic context where output is
growing and the budget challenge is redefined as maintaining debt sustainability. Once again, political
economy considerations speak to assigning interest rate policy to the output target and fiscal policy to the
debt sustainability target.
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achieve both targets if the interest rate is off the table and set equal to zero (Palley, 2015b,
p.53-54).
More generally, in a Tinbergen (1952) world economic policymakers have many
targets and tend to be short of instruments. Those targets include full employment,
business cycle stabilization, low inflation, government debt sustainability, financial
market stability, the exchange rate, and the trade balance. Yet, MMT discards interest rate
policy which is an important tool of macroeconomic management. Worse yet, by parking
the nominal interest rate at zero or near zero, MMT would likely encourage financial
instability and exacerbate problems that are already in play from printing money.
3.5 Disingenuity about the role and necessity of taxes
The fifth column in Figure 2 concerns MMT’s disingenuity about the role and necessity
of taxes. That disingenuity has been emphasized by Marxists and left economists
(Henwood, 2019; Sawicky, 2019) and is succinctly summarized by Brueing (2019): “The
real point of MMT seems to be to deploy misleading rhetoric with the goal of deceiving
people about the necessity of taxes in a social democratic system.”
Marxist economists have focused on MMT’s blithe dismissal of the problematic
of taxes. As noted above, if the economy reaches full employment (however defined),
taxes become necessary to restrain AD and prevent inflation. Consequently, the reality is
government programs ultimately have to be paid for via taxes. If taxes are ultimately
necessary to finance government programs, delivering those taxes requires the
appropriate politics be in place. Those politics inevitably involve class conflict. Viewed
in that light, Marxists argue MMT is deficient on two counts. First, it is evasive about the
ultimate necessity of taxes. Second, it fails to recognize that tax outcomes are ultimately
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shaped by class conflict and depend on power relations, which in turn are substantially
determined by the economic fundamentals of capitalist economies. From a Marxist
perspective that makes MMT a new political strategy for finessing the politics of austerity
rather than a new economic theory.
That tax deception is facilitated by MMT’s static “moment in time” economic
analysis. At a moment in time, particularly when unemployment is high, it may look as if
taxes are unnecessary as resources are available, financial constraints on government are
currently non-binding, and government can create money. However, those conditions will
change. Taxes become unavoidable as the economy moves along the Phillips curve and
inflation increases owing to greater resource demands, and taxes may even be needed
earlier if other economic constraints kick in earlier.
MMT’s disingenuity about taxes was evident in recent US discussions about an
expanded welfare state. MMT proponents advocate for national health insurance
(Medicare for All), expanded retirement income (Social Security), and free university
tuition. Their claim is those programs can be had because of government’s ability to print
money. The reality is the needed resources would have far exceed the economic capacity
available at the date of discussion (Palley, 2019). Consequently, the program spree would
have generated excess demand and inflation unless paid for by taxes and fees.
The important point is that taxes are needed to pay for on-going programs, and
money financed deficit spending is at best a temporary free lunch.25 Moreover, as many
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As is widely known, in a growing economy there is always some permanent free lunch in that the money
stock can grow at the rate of GDP growth plus inflation. As shown by Cagan (1956), inflation is a two
edged sword. On one hand, faster inflation increases the free lunch by increasing the inflation tax rate on
money holdings. On the other hand, faster inflation reduces the demand for money, thereby reducing the
base on which the inflation tax is levied.
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programs are intended to have a significant redistributive component, taxes are also
needed to accomplish redistribution. Consequently, taxes are unavoidable for both
macroeconomic capacity reasons and microeconomic redistribution reasons.
More generally, it is pure semantics whether taxes raise money to finance
government spending, or taxes destroy money in order to create the space for reissue of
money to finance spending. Taxation and spending occur simultaneously, and taxes are an
intrinsic part of the system and cannot be done away with. Even when the economy is far
from the full employment/inflation target, taxes are needed to finance the vast bulk of
spending. Money financed budget deficits provide some space at the margin for
temporary additional spending, which eventually either has to be cut or be financed by
some combination of taxes and borrowing when the economy’s constraints bite.26
3.6 Exorbitant privilege and US centric thinking
The sixth column in Figure 2 concerns exorbitant privilege and the US centric nature of
MMT’s theorizing. MMT represents itself as a general theory applicable to all sovereign
governments. However, the self-evident inability of most sovereign governments to
pursue its policy recommendations promotes widespread skepticism among economists
from those countries. In response, MMT tends to revert to justifying its claims by appeal
to the US (and, to a lesser degree, to economies of other countries whose currencies serve
as international reserve currencies). Here too MMT falls apart as the above arguments
apply to all governments, including the US government, albeit in differing degrees. As
regards the US, that is evidenced by the problems experienced by the US dollar in the
1970s which was an era of high inflation.
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If the economy is away from steady-state and the inflation rate and the money-GDP ratio are both rising,
then there will be additional temporary financial space along the traverse to the steady-state.
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That said, it is easy to misperceive the fiscal capacity of the US government as
confirming MMT. That is because the US government superficially appears to have the
power to conduct policy as prescribed by MMT. However, that appearance is false. The
US conveys a misleading impression because it is the beneficiary of the fact that the
world operates on a de facto dollar standard. That gives rise to the phenomenon of
“exorbitant privilege” (Eichengreen, 2011), whereby the US benefits from issuing dollars
to meet the global economy’s dollar needs. That makes it look as if the US economy
conforms to MMT when, in fact, a completely different phenomenon is at work.
Moreover, retaining the benefits of exorbitant privilege subjects the US to policy limits
and responsibilities.27
The reality that the US is, in principle, potentially subject to the same type of
constraints as other governments is evidenced by the economic history of the 1970s. That
era was a period of dollar weakness, and it shows the US can also be subject to biting
financial constraints.
4. Employer of last resort (ELR)/job guarantee program (JGP)28
The second leg of MMT’s triad of arguments in Figure 1 is the proposal for an ELR or
JGP, whereby the central government would offer work to any who applied (i.e. act as
employer of last resort). In principle, the JGP is completely separable from MMT and can
be considered as a stand-alone program on the basis of its own merits. However, for
MMT, the JGP is central because it is how policy is supposed to harness government’s
power to create money so as to deliver productive non-inflationary full employment.

27

The requirements for being a reserve currency issuer are discussed extensively by Epstein (2019). The
important implication is that the capacity to reap the benefits of currency issuance depends on special
institutional circumstances and is not available to all sovereign currency issuers, in contradiction of MMT.
28
Many of the arguments in this section are drawn from Palley (2018b).
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The employer of last resort JGP can be thought of as an attempt to create an
automatic stabilizer in the spirit of Lerner’s (1943, 1951) functional finance approach to
macroeconomic policy. Lerner’s approach has government engage in expansionary
“discretionary” fiscal policy until the economy reaches full employment, at which time
policymakers are supposed to step on the fiscal policy brakes. The JGP aims to create an
“automatic stabilizer” version of functional finance. That is because, theoretically, there
should be no spending on JGP jobs at full employment since all workers are supposedly
employed in the private sector. Consequently, spending would automatically taper off.
Though JGP spending automatically adjusts, a JGP is not an anti-inflation buffer
stock mechanism contrary to the claims of Mitchell and Mosler (2001). A JGP sets a
wage floor which acts as a buffer stock mechanism guarding against deflation. It does so
by drawing labor supply off the market as unemployment increases. However, it does not
mitigate inflation by adding additional labor supply as unemployment decreases. The
buffer against inflation is the supply of available labor and that is the same, with or
without a JGP.29
In theory, the JGP proposal has significant macroeconomic benefits including
generating a particular type of full employment, providing another automatic countercyclical stabilization mechanism, preserving the skills of unemployed workers by
keeping them in jobs, and providing society with the benefits of the output produced by
JGP workers.

29

That contrasts with a commodity buffer stock mechanism in which previously stored commodity
supplies are released for sale when the price hits the “ceiling” price. One caveat is if the JGP increases
labor supply by keeping workers attached to the labor market, which would damp inflation.
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However, it also has significant downsides which MMT proponents dismiss.30
One downside is the cost of a JGP, which could displace other needed programs (though
MMT denies that by assumption because it asserts government is financially
unconstrained). A second downside is the potential to displace private sector production if
workers prefer JGP jobs. A third downside is JGP jobs can be used to undercut public
sector unions and enforce workfare in place of welfare. In effect, a JGP could be used by
a neoliberal government as a double-edged sword to undercut public sector employment
from above, and undercut worker rights from below. A fourth downside is some JGP jobs
might be characterized as “make work”, and that could be used as political fodder by
neoliberals in their war on government.
The JGP proposal also augments inflation worries that are already inherent in
MMT’s money-financed approach to fiscal policy. The main problem is a JGP sets a real
wage floor for the entire economy, thereby implicitly introducing inflation indexation. As
the economy approaches full employment, inflation will tend to rise in accordance with
Phillips curve logic. That will trigger a higher nominal JGP wage, and raising the nominal
wage floor will tend to spread inflation throughout the economy. If private sector firms
fail to match the JGP nominal wage increase, workers will start to drift toward JGP jobs,
causing a contraction of private sector output that could even potentially cause
stagflation. The JGP is intended to be a non-inflationary automatic fiscal stabilizer. Yet
closer inspection shows its implicit indexing may also render it an automatic inflation
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There is a significant literature that is critical of the ELR/JGP proposal which includes Aspromorgous
(2000), Palley (2001, 2018b, 2018c), Sawyer (2003, 2005), and Seccarecia (2004).
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destabilizer.31
Furthermore, to the extent that a JGP delivers quasi-full employment, it will also
tend to exacerbate income distribution conflict inflation which emerges at full
employment (Kalecki, 1943). That is because it would remove or diminish the threat of
labor pricing itself out of work, thereby potentially increasing wage demands. The
problem of full employment conflict inflation is generic, but a JGP would exacerbate it.
Indeed, a JGP could trigger such inflation even earlier by emboldening wage demands
earlier in the business cycle. There is no easy solution to that problem, which explains
Lerner’s (1977, 1978) interest in Wage Increase Permits (WIPs). However, MMT
proponents are wrong to claim that a JGP is not afflicted by the conflict inflation
problem, and they are doubly wrong to be dismissive of Lerner’s later concerns that
prompted his WIPs proposal.
Those multiple adverse considerations suggest it may be better to use and
strengthen existing policy modalities to secure stable full employment. Such modalities
include structural measures to improve income distribution (e.g. restoring worker
bargaining power and reinvigorating progressive taxation) so as to rebuild the aggregate
demand generation process, combined with strengthened and improved counter-cyclical
stabilization policy (e.g. planned counter-cyclical infrastructure spending, countercyclical interest rate policy plus counter-cyclical asset and credit market policy based on
asset based reserve requirements.32
31

Note, this income distribution conflict problem is less present in an indexed real minimum wage because
there is no guaranteed offer of a job at that real wage. A real minimum wage only affects the terms of labor
supply. A real JGP wage affects both labor supply and labor demand.
32
Crocker (2020), who is a proponent of MMT, advocates a universal basic income (UBI) rather than a
JGP. In addition to sharing the critics’ concerns with a JGP, Crocker argues current unemployment is due
to insufficient AD owing to income inequality. A UBI explicitly targets more equal income distribution,
making it a superior policy instrument compared to a JGP.

30

5. The history of money33
The third leg of MMT’s triad of arguments in Figure 1 refers to the history of money.
That leg is essentially rhetorical and it is not as important as the arguments about either
the macroeconomics of money financed budget deficits or the JGP. It is there to enlist
monetary history in support of MMT’s macroeconomic argument, which is why monetary
history figures so prominently in MMT’s narrative (Wray, 1998, 2015, 2019). The claim
is the history of money is “chartal”, by which is meant money is a token created and
spent by government, that then circulates as money.
Unfortunately, monetary history does not support MMT’s claim, and it is
especially confounded by the fact that for most of the past two thousand years money has
involved gold and silver bullion. Metallic money is the exact opposite of chartal money
since government cannot create gold and silver money out of thin air. In a metallic
system, government must first tax or borrow to acquire money to spend, which is
completely contrary to MMT’s fundamental macroeconomic logic. As Rochon and
Vernengo (2003) argue, even though modern money ends up being chartalist, its origins
are not.
The US only became fully chartal on August 13, 1971 when President Nixon
suspended official convertibility (i.e. the right of foreign governments to convert dollars
into gold). That suspension undoubtedly gave US policymakers an important additional
degree of policy freedom. However, the other constraints on budget policy imposed by
existing debts, existing large federal expenditures, financial markets, and the Phillips
curve all carried over the day after suspension.
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The arguments in this section are drawn from Palley (2018a).
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Indeed, the financial experience after the suspension of official convertibility
confirms the existence of those constraints. Thus, the 1970s weakening of the dollar and
higher inflation can be partly attributed to financial markets’ response to the end of dollar
convertibility, which shows financial markets do respond to public finance
developments.34
6. Conclusion: MMT as political polemic
This paper has examined the theoretical foundations of MMT. It began with a discussion
of what MMT is not about. It is not about Keynesian economics, the effectiveness of
deficit financed fiscal policy, endogenous money, stock-flow consistent modelling, or
macroeconomic sectoral balance analysis. Instead, MMT’s major unique claim is that
sovereign governments, with flexible exchange rates and without foreign currency debt,
are financially unconstrained owing to their ability to issue money.
The paper showed MMT over-simplifies the macro economy and exaggerates
policy capabilities. All macroeconomic models are highly simplified representations of
reality. MMT takes the standard Keynesian macro model and further assumes away the
real world challenges of the economy and policymaking. The resulting over-simplified
static model makes it look as if sovereign government is financially unconstrained and
full employment without inflation is an easy reach for policy. Once those oversimplifications are walked back, MMT’s claim dissolves and MMT reduces back to a
version of old Keynesianism.
34

MMT tends to dismiss the problems of the US dollar in the 1970s, as if current favorable conditions are
a permanent fact of nature. The dollar’s difficulties in the 1970s are evidence that even the US can be
subject to international constraints, though that may be difficult to recognize now given the dollar’s current
hegemonic standing. Ironically, were the US to formally adopt MMT as the basis for budget policy, that
shift might even trigger financial disruption, inflation and dollar weakness. That possibility is yet another
example of the importance of taking account of policy regime in macroeconomic analysis, which is
something MMT systematically fails to do.
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Despite MMT’s analytical economic deficiencies, it has made huge advances as
popular political polemic. Its success is due to two factors. First, MMT has a simple and
clear narrative. Second, events have exposed the neoliberal lie regarding the
ineffectiveness of and lack of financial space for fiscal policy, creating an opening in
public discourse which MMT has seized.
As regards narrative, MMT’s printing press economics has provided a simple
counter to the neoliberalism’s claim that government has no financial space because it is
akin to a private household. MMT’s identification of the financial space provided by the
power to create money exposes the falsity of the household analogy.35
Unfortunately, MMT exaggerates and stretches things. That should be no surprise:
sometimes a little nonsense is needed to beat nonsense. Political success requires
message simplification, and simplification involves cutting details. Thus, the ability to
create money is transformed into the notion of government being financially
unconstrained and not needing taxes or bonds to finance spending.
MMT’s political polemic works best in the US, where government is in a special
position owing to strong current economic conditions, the current low inflation climate,
and the unique position of the dollar as global reserve currency which diminishes
problems associated with trade deficits and exchange rates. However, the polemic is
largely unpersuasive to economists in Latin America and emerging market economies.
Those economies do not have the characteristics of the US, and their governments are
visibly policy constrained by financial markets and foreign exchange concerns.

35

The principle reasons the analogy is false are (1) government can raise taxes to pay its bills while
households cannot, (2) government can issue money to pay its bills, and (3) government lives forever
whereas householders do not, so that government’s income stream is far longer.
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The success of MMT’s polemic poses difficulties for progressive economists. On
one hand, the polemic is useful for advancing progressive economic policy so that
undermining it would be a step back politically. On the other hand, MMT’s economics is
over-simplified and exaggerated. That creates a dilemma that often afflicts the middle
ground, which gets squeezed by simplistic extremes that have persuasive traction in
political discourse.
In the fiscal policy debate, the extremes are MMT and austerity. The former
argues government is financially unconstrained, while the latter argues government is
akin to a household and has little financial space. Both are wrong. For progressive
Keynesians, in the current political moment, the dilemma is that mere admission of the
existence of financial constraints on government may facilitate neoliberal austerity which
has done such damage over the past two decades.
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